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Monday, April 07, 2025

Cooperative Election Study

Latest angles on Trump-era 'evangelicals,' including questions about the vague label itself

Latest angles on Trump-era 'evangelicals,' including questions about the vague label itself

This Memo concerns not some breaking story but a potential scenario about U.S. "evangelical" Protestants that reporters on both the politics and religion beats should be watching.

For the umpteenth time we revisit the definition of this vibrant but challenged movement and its relation to a Republican Party that the secularized Donald Trump continues to dominate.

(See The Guy's effort at defining evangelicalism here, and remember that most media discussions involve White evangelicals only, since Black and Hispanic evangelicals are very different politically. And click here for a wave of tmatt posts on this topic.)

GetReligion team member Ryan Burge, an energetic political scientist who posts interesting data most days of the week, tweeted this chart on Sept. 16th showing how self-identified evangelicals described their own church attendance over a dozen years in Cooperative Election Study polling.

There's a clear developing trend. As recently as 2008, 58.6% of self-identified evangelicals said they worshiped weekly or more often, but less than half (49.9%) by 2020.

Over the same years, evangelicals who "seldom" or "never" attended grew from 16.1% to 26.7%. The slide did not begin with the Trump presidency but was already at work, since in 2016 the weekly-or-mores were down to 52.9% and seldom-or-nevers up to 22.6%.

The Guy considers attendance a good barometer of devotion, as a historically central value inside the evangelical subculture. We can speculate that similar downward slides might be occurring with other bonding activities in the evangelical tradition such as adult Bible classes, prayer meetings, small groups, daily devotions, evangelistic revivals and charity projects.

The numbers surely reflect the nation's 21st Century secularization. But Burge reaches the provocative conclusion that they mean evangelical "is not a religious term anymore." (What substitute word would suffice? There's a story theme for you.) Certain movement insiders have argued that a different label is needed because the term has taken on such a heavy Republican – and Trumpublican – flavor


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Do Christian 'conservatives' have different beliefs than secular 'conservatives'?

Do Christian 'conservatives' have different beliefs than secular 'conservatives'?

I very much enjoy when other people share my work, especially when they have an audience as large as Rod Dreher’s over at the American Conservative.

Dreher recently picked up on a piece that I wrote laying out the most recent data that we have on the religiosity of Generation Z. In short, about 45% of them do not identify with a religious tradition. But, where a lot of that growth is coming from is through young people who identify as politically conservative.

Dreher writes:

“I would like to know what separates conservative Nones from political conservatives who are religious. That is, on what political points they differ. Are the Nones pro-choice, for example? I’m guessing they are probably fine with gay rights, though I don’t know what they think about trans; maybe they’re for it. What, exactly, makes them conservative?”

Well, I can make an attempt at documenting whether politically conservative Christians look like politically conservative nones using the same data sources that were included in my post.

Let’s start very broadly, by assessing just what percentage of Christians (regardless of age) identify as conservatives compared to those who are atheists, agnostics, or nothing in particular.

Just a bit less than 50% of Christians (of all races) identify as politically conservative. That’s been basically true dating back to 2008. The share has never dropped below 45% and vacillates very little from year to year. It’s fair to say that 47-48% of Christians are conservatives. The share of nothing in particulars who are conservative is much lower. In 2008, it was just 21% but that slowly crept up to 27% by 2011, but has stuck around 25% in the last few years.

Political conservatives represent a very small portion of atheists and agnostics. In 2008, just one in 10 atheists and agnostics were conservative. By 2014, that had increased to 15% for agnostics, and maybe had jumped a single point for atheists. By 2020, 11% of agnostics were conservative and 9% of atheists.

But looked at holistically, it’s important to note that about three quarters of all conservatives identify as Christians, 17% are secular and the remainder come from smaller religious groups like Jews, Hindus, Muslims, etc.


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Future scenarios emerge as the media debate the health of U.S. Mainline Protestantism 

Future scenarios emerge as the media debate the health of U.S. Mainline Protestantism 

What has long been called “Mainline” Protestantism suffered inexorable shrinkage this past generation, eroding so much of its once-potent U.S. cultural impact that the news media tend to neglect these moderate-to-liberal churches. Yet a new Public Religion Research Institute poll reported what it argues is a sudden comeback and indicates Mainliners even outnumber the rival conservative "evangelicals" widely thought to dominate Protestantism.

True? The Religion Guy assembled devastating statistics that raise questions about that claim.

U.S. religion's hot number-cruncher Ryan Burge is even more doubtful and notes the Harvard-based Cooperative Election Study found a recent rise in Americans who self-identify as "evangelical."

As reporters ponder that debate, they should also play out longer-term Mainline scenarios, for instance for the Episcopal Church and United Methodist Church.

The hed on another Burge article proclaimed that "The Death of the Episcopal Church is Near."

"I don't think it's an exaggeration at all to believe that Episcopalians will no longer exist by 2040," he contended.

His gloomy forecast relied partly on a stark, candid piece from the blog of the Living Church magazine. It reasoned that annual marriages and baptisms foretell how the denomination will fare. If trends continue, the former would fall from 39,000 in 1980 to 750 as of 2050, and the latter from 56,000 to 2,500, over decades when average worship attendance would plummet from 857,000 to 150,000.

Similarly, in 2019 the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America's research agency projected that this now-sizable denomination would dip below 67,000 members by 2050 and average Sunday attendance would hit 16,000 by 2041. Two years before that, Wheaton College's Ed Stetzer notably warned that Mainline Protestantism has "23 Easters left."


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2020 revisited: Repeat after me, White Catholic voters, White Catholic voters ...

2020 revisited: Repeat after me, White Catholic voters, White Catholic voters ...

The two main November exit polls showed Joseph Biden, the first Catholic elected U.S. president since John F. Kennedy, won either 52% or 49% support among Catholics over-all.

That's quite the plummet from 1960, when the Gallup Poll found J.F.K. scored 78 percent.

Reporters covering either politics or religion pay heed: Other remarkable data appear in the first batch of 2020 findings from the Harvard University-based Cooperative Election Study (CES), with more due in July. Though Hispanic and other minority Catholics went only 30% for Donald Trump (up from 26% in 2016), white Catholics gave the Republican impressive 59% support over their fellow church member, up a notch from 57% in 2016.

The massive CES sample of 61,000 allows good breakdowns by religion (also a highly useful feature with many Pew Research surveys). The CES data were explored for Religion Unplugged by ubiquitous political scientist Ryan Burge, a GetReligion contributor.

The Guy once again preaches to the U.S. media that those white Catholics are the nation's largest chunk of swing voters who can decide competitive elections except in Protestant tracts of the Southeast, and that they deserve more attention than the lavishly covered white "evangelicals," perennial knee-jerk Republicans who may edge up or down but never "swing."

That was true in 2016. It was true again in 2020. It’s especially interesting to look for patterns among generic “Catholic voters” and voters who are active, Mass-attending Catholics.


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