American National Election Study

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Double-thinking about atheists: What's up with their role in America's hot public square?

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Double-thinking about atheists: What's up with their role in America's hot public square?

I live in Southern Appalachia, which is in Bible Belt territory on anyone’s map of America.

Then again, I live near the Oak Ridge National Laboratory — a place where the nerdy PhD’s per-square-foot count is the same or higher than, well, the California Institute of Technology or the University of California, Berkeley. In other words, it’s surprisingly easy to run into local atheists and agnostics just about anywhere one engages in conversation (take the gym, for example).

Are these unbelievers hostile? Let’s just say that the real people I meet in this niche religious group (#ducking) are different from those I encounter in cyberspace. Maybe there’s something about the Southern Highlands that attracts friendly atheists-agnostics?

I thought about this phenomenon when I saw this recent Graphs about Religion headline from political scientist (and GetReligion contributor Ryan Burge: “Just How Much Do Americans Dislike Atheists?”

This new Burge piece reminded me of his earlier piece: “No One Participates in Politics More than Atheists — Even White Evangelicals.” Remember these reflections on the Cooperative Election Study question: “Have you done any of the following activities in the previous month?”

The group that is most likely to contact a public official? Atheists.

The group that puts up political signs at the highest rates? Atheists.

HALF of atheists report giving to a candidate or campaign in the 2020 presidential election cycle.

And while they don’t lead the pack when it comes to attending a local political meeting, they only trail Hindus by four percentage points.

Anyway, I stashed these Burge URLs in my growing “Thinker piece” file — along with a very interesting (and I would argue, related) Pew Research Center post with this headline: “One-in-six Americans have taken steps to see less of someone on social media due to religious content.”

Let’s try to connect a few dots.


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Did mainstream media distort America's religion-and-politics divide? Are they still doing so?

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Did mainstream media distort America's religion-and-politics divide? Are they still doing so?

While culling files from decades of religion-beat work, The Religion Guy has come across a forgotten and seminal article from 2002 that contended the media were distorting public understanding of American politics. It said "religious right" Republicans were blanketed with coverage and turned the tables, contending that "the true origins" of cultural conflict were found in increased "secularist" influence in the Democratic Party.

As journalists contemplate the tumult of the succeeding two decades, ask what the article in question might say about media performance, past and present.

Consider the hostility toward openly religious nominees expressed by Senators Schumer, Feinstein, and Harris (now vice president and prospective future president). Or contrast the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which passed the Senate 97-3 in 1993, with current House Democrats' unanimous vote for the pending Equality Act, which would forbid practical applications of that very law.

Customary political history emphasizes such landmarks as the Rev. Jerry Falwell (Senior) launching Moral Majority in 1979, Ronald Reagan's Republicans cultivating conservative Christians in the winning 1980 campaign or the Rev. Pat Robertson founding Christian Coalition in 1989 after his Republican run for president.

These events were important, of course. But what about Democrats and the other half of what was happening?

That's the focus of the 2002 article, by political scientists Louis Boice and Gerald De Maio from the City University of New York's Baruch College, drawn from their 2001 presentation at an academic conference. The piece appeared in the conservative journal The Public Interest, which is now defunct, but fortunately the American Political Science Association archive has posted the text (.pdf here). Also, click here and then here for tmatt columns on this duo’s work.

In their telling, 1972, the year before the Supreme Court legalized abortion, was the pivot point for Democrats' shift on emotion-laden social issues away from cultural conservatism and an "accommodation" policy toward religion.


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Weekend thinking about this complex reality: More and more Americans hate each other

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It’s impossible, at the moment, to follow political and religious threads on social media without running into lots and lots of hate. This is not something that started in the past two weeks or even during the 2016 race for the White House.

With that sobering thought in mind, I offer a Damon Linker essay at The Week as our weekend think piece. The headline: “Don't willfully ignore the complexity of what's happening in America right now.”

However, before we go there, let me share some sobering observations from an “On Religion” column I wrote in 2004 about the work of political scientists Gerald De Maio, a Catholic, and Louis Bolce, an Episcopalian, who teach at Baruch College in the City University of New York. The headline: “Stalking the anti-fundamentalist voter.”

This was one of the first times when I realized that “hate” was becoming a strong factor in public life — especially when driven by a loaded religious term like “fundamentalist.”

First we need some background. Bolce and De Maio:

… have focused much of their work on the "thermometer scale" used in the 2000 American National Election Study and those that preceded it. Low temperatures indicate distrust or hatred while high numbers show trust and respect. Thus, "anti-fundamentalist voters" are those who gave fundamentalists a rating of 25 degrees or colder. By contrast, the rating that "strong liberals" gave to "strong conservatives" was a moderate 47 degrees.

Yet 89 percent of white delegates to the 1992 Democratic National Convention qualified as "anti-fundamentalist voters," along with 57 percent of Jewish voters, 51 percent of "moral liberals," 48 percent of school-prayer opponents, 44 percent of secularists and 31 percent of "pro-choice" voters. In 1992, 53 percent of those white Democratic delegates gave Christian fundamentalists a thermometer rating of zero.

"Anti-fundamentalist voter" patterns are not seen among black voters, noted De Maio. Researchers are now paying closer attention to trends among Hispanics.

What about the prejudices of the fundamentalists? Their average thermometer rating toward Catholics was a friendly 62 degrees, toward blacks 66 degrees and Jews 68 degrees.

This brings us to a complex set of remarks by Linker. Here is the overture:


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